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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

25X1

TO : Mr. Prescott Childs

DATE: 6 October 1948

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT: Coordination of Intelligence Memoranda prepared by ORE

1. This afternoon at the urgent request of Colonel Merritt Booth, I went to the Department of State to discuss with him a problem upon which he was speaking as official mouthpiece for the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

2. Colonel Booth stated that approximately a month ago, he spoke to [redacted] who is on the Policy and Planning Staff of the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates, regarding the prior clearance with the intelligence organization of the Department of State of the substance of intelligence memoranda before said memoranda are released by CIA to the requesting agency. Booth suggested to [redacted] that, if the papers were not cleared in their formative stages, the intelligence organization of the Department of State should at least know about such papers before they are distributed.

3. [redacted] said that many people within CIA were of the opinion that all requests for the Joint Staff should be answered directly by CIA without consultative advise from, or the informing of, departmental intelligence agencies.

4. Booth contended that Generals Grunther and Todd did not like such a procedure and they were of the opinion that the political, sociological and cultural aspects of any intelligence memorandum were first cleared, or at least brought to the attention of the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

5. [redacted] apparently, expressed himself sympathetically toward the views propounded by Colonel Booth and the telephone conversation ended on a tone which was somewhat encouraging to the Department of State.

6. What has now disturbed the officials of the Department of State is that they learned for the first time in the "Staff Intelligence Status Report" of 1 October 1948, regarding the preparation of many intelligence memoranda in which the Department of State intelligence organization feels it has a primary interest and responsibility. State contends that the intelligence memoranda regarding which they should have had some knowledge are the following:

*Subject
will be done*

*? hot yet
clear*


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7. In support of the standpoint of the Department of State, the following views are given for your consideration:

a. paragraph 3 of NSCID 1 reads in part: "Coordination of intelligence activities should be designed primarily to strengthen the overall governmental intelligence structure. Primary departmental requirements shall be recognized and shall receive the cooperation and support of the Central Intelligence Agency." (Underscoring supplied.) Referring to the functions of DCI, a section of paragraph 4 of the same Directive reads: "In so far as practicable, he shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various Departments and Agencies but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities and shall utilize departmental intelligence for such production purposes." (Underscoring supplied.)

b. The categories of State Department responsibility which should be recognized and supported by CIA are certainly those dominant interests enumerated in NSCID 2 and NSCID 3, viz: political, cultural, and sociological.

c. The Department of State contends that the intelligence memoranda enumerated above in paragraph 6 contain material which is within their departmental area of responsibility and,

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*CIA circulation rather than
internal CIA "for the DCI".*

as such, the department had a right to comment, or if time did not permit, at least should have had current knowledge that the problem was being considered by CIA. This is the State Department's interpretation of DCI 3/1.

8. The intelligence organization of the Department of State requests that ICAPS take official cognizance of this problem and pursue the necessary steps to prevent recurrences of this procedure.

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